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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 24, 1981


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TO: SIG Participants (See List Below)
SUBJECT: SIG Meeting on Somalia

Under Secretary Buckley will chair a Senior Inter-departmental Group Meeting on Somalia on November 25, 10:00 A.M. in Room 7516, the Operations Center Conference Room at the Department of State. The attached papers will serve as the basis for the discussion.

Participation will be limited to Principal plus one. Please phone the names of your agency's representatives to Sheila Lopez, 632-5804.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Agenda
2. Options Paper on Somalia
3. Draft Cable

Distribution:

OVP - Ms. Nancy Bearg Dyke
NSC - Mr. Allen Lenz
DOD - Col. John Stanford
JCS - LTC Edward Bucknell
CIA - 

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State Dept. review completed

AGENDA

1. OSD REPORT ON ASD WEST'S TRIP TO SOMALIA
2. CONSIDERATION OF GROUND ORIENTED PACKAGE
3. TRANSFER OF M-47 TANKS FROM ITALY TO SOMALIA
4. AIR DEFENSE OPTIONS
5. ASSESSMENT OF RISKS AND RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS

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Security Assistance for Somalia

Background:

Somalia is important to us both for political and strategic reasons. The imbalance between Somali national forces and Ethiopian forces supported by Cuba and Libya is now so great that there is a risk of a country perceived as our friend being bullied by a combination of Soviet clients. The fate of Somalia -- a country that took our side and is now threatened -- will transmit a strong signal to the region about how advantageous it is to be associated with us.

Moreover, Somalia, because of its strategic location, offers a possible way of providing access to the area for Persian Gulf contingencies. While we have thus far chosen to avoid basing our planning heavily on Somalia, Somalia could become more significant in scenarios where we are deprived of access elsewhere, particularly Ras Banas. Facilities in Somalia would be very useful also for protection of sea lanes of communication in a Southwest Asia contingency.

In mid-1980, we established a cooperative relationship which included access to Somali facilities, a U.S. expression of interest in Somalia's territorial integrity and security, and a modest security assistance program. In view of the significant presence of regular Somali military forces in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, we proceeded cautiously, offering a total of only \$40 million in FMS credits for FY 80 and 81, restricting arms sales to defensive systems such as TPS 43 early warning radars and Vulcan short range air defense guns, and refraining from providing U.S.-made portable missiles like Redeye.

Since then, Siad's regular forces have been driven from the Ogaden (although they still conduct shallow penetration cross border operations), Somali towns near the border have been periodically bombed by Ethiopian aircraft, and the threat to Somalia from the Ethiopian and Libyan supported Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF) appears to have been intensified by the August 1981 cooperation agreement among Ethiopia, Libya and South Yemen.

Following Ethiopian air raids in June 1981, Siad urgently requested that we do more to help him meet his air defense needs. In response, we have offered to initiate a limited program to assist the Somalis in restoring some of their Soviet-origin radars and air defense guns to operational

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condition, and are in the process of transferring 15 Soviet-built SA-7 man portable air defense missiles to Somalia. In addition, in order to demonstrate support for Somalia, we are conducting part of Bright Star 82 at Berbera, and have given the Italians informal approval for the transfer to Somalia of about 100 U.S.-origin, Korean War vintage M-47 tanks. The Italians are being pressed by Ethiopia not to provide security assistance to Somalia, and, despite the fact that they originally suggested the transfer, it is not clear that they are, at present, ready to go ahead.

We have requested \$20 million in FMS in FY 82 for Somalia, and are proposing an increase to \$30 million in FY 83.

The Problem:

The steps we have taken so far have not met Somalia's military need to respond to the Ethiopian air threat nor have they met the political need of the Somali leadership to demonstrate to their military and civil constituencies that the new relationship with the United States would benefit Somalia.

The M-47 tanks will contribute nothing to air defense. The repair of Soviet air defense equipment (one or two radars and a few guns) and the provision of a few SA-7's will have only a limited impact on Somali air defense capabilities.

The TPS 43 radars and Vulcan guns which the Somalis have ordered from us are turning out to be more expensive than originally estimated. In addition, the lead time for delivery of the radars is two years and that for the Vulcans is three years. Finally, by themselves, the radars and Vulcans will not provide the Somalis with an effective air defense against the Ethiopian threat.

As a result, the Somalis have become increasingly disenchanted with our security assistance efforts. The Minister of Defense has told us he wants to cancel the Vulcan order, and instead procure communications and transportation equipment. The cancellation would free some of the approximately \$12 million now obligated for Vulcan, but a portion of this would have to be reserved to cover termination costs, amount currently unknown.

The Somalis do not appear to have given up on air defense in general, however, since they want to continue with the purchase of the radars, and have broached the idea of trading their 11 MIG 21s for F-5s.

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We are also likely to encounter problems in the M-47 tank transfer, even if the Italians do decide to proceed. DOD will send a team to determine the condition of the tanks, but they are reportedly in bad shape -- many lacking engines or radios. If the reports are borne out, the Somalis will be sorely disappointed and likely to turn to us to restore them to operable condition. We could well become caught between the Somalis and Italians.

The Minister of Defense wishes to visit Washington in the near future to discuss the military assistance relationship with the aim of resolving these issues.

Our Options:

We need to decide how to respond to the Somalis. The IG considered several options:

1. There was a general consensus that the most appropriate course of action would be to continue to respond to the air defense problem but, at the same time, offer the Somalis the choice of dual use transportation, communication, and engineer items which could be delivered rapidly. This would answer the Somali need to demonstrate that the US relationship provides some benefit, and it would also meet the expressed Somali desire to obtain transportation and communications equipment. Such a program should include provisions for contract maintenance to insure adequate maintenance of the equipment.

As far as air defense is concerned, we would acquiesce in the Somali request to cancel Vulcan, but continue the sale of three TPS 43 radars. We would also proceed with programs to repair two of their Soviet supplied early warning radars, and approximately twenty-five of their 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, if the GSDR approves such initiatives. Improved communications and transportation would also have some positive, although indirect, impact on their air defense capability. In addition, if the Somalis desired, we would be prepared to investigate the feasibility of helping them, as part of the FMS program, repair and maintain their Soviet-supplied air defense missiles and aircraft or to consider the sale of additional appropriate US items such as radars.

In view of the increasingly hostile Ethiopian attitude toward Somalia and the US, it is likely that Somali towns, such as Galcaio and Dusa Mareb, near the border will be bombed again. We should recognize that, even if the Somalis accept this option, (as we believe they will,) it will not enable them to prevent such bombing. Regardless of what they may say now, we may well be faced again, as we were last June, by urgent Somali requests for assistance in air defense. This situation would prove damaging to our reputation for being able to help our friends.

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2. A major effort to remedy Somalia's air defense needs would be expensive. A five-year program, laid out by a 1980 State/Defense Team which surveyed Somalia's military needs, would cost approximately \$3 billion. It would be sufficient to provide protection against air attacks on Somali territory and to maintain a credible deterrent against ground attack. The air defense portion alone, including eight batteries of I-Hawk and three squadrons of F-5s would cost over \$1 billion.

Any program of this magnitude would cause great concern to the Kenyans, and under certain conditions, could trigger an Ethiopian response. The IG concluded, moreover, that, under current fiscal constraints, such a program was infeasible.

3. Alternative air defense packages. Accelerating delivery of Vulcan, as previously requested by the Somalis, or providing Redeye was discussed. Acceleration of Vulcan would be difficult. The production line has to be restarted, the three-year production lead time is virtually incompressible, and US forces already have less than 50% of their authorized stocks. Moreover, it is not clear the Somalis would change their desire to cancel the Vulcan buy even if we were to offer accelerated delivery. Redeye presents problems of safety and reliability as well as the political problems of possible diversion to terrorist use. It would offer no advantage over the SA-7s we are now providing, except that the SA-7s are limited in number.

In any case, Vulcans or Redeye would not be effective in preventing bombing of Somali towns near the border from higher altitudes. Systems at least as effective as Chaparral or the British-produced Rapier, and preferably as capable as I-Hawk, would be necessary. A battery of either system would cost something on the order of \$80 million, which, in the absence of increased FMS funding for Somalia, would absorb roughly three years worth of credits, making accelerated delivery impossible and limiting the funds available for other purchases. Chaparral has a production lead time of 40 months, and Rapier, although probably available in 12 months, would be difficult in terms of assuring follow-on support, since it would be procured off-shore.

Conclusions:

The consensus of the IG was that:

- a. We should insure that the Somalis are informed promptly of the condition of the M-47 tanks before they agree to accept them. If, knowing their condition, they can reach a mutually acceptable arrangement with the Italians we

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will approve the transfer. If they are not able to agree, we should avoid getting involved in a program to refurbish the tanks. We will have to decide to what extent we can assist in transport, training and follow-on support.

b. Given current assistance levels, we cannot, in the short run, prevent the Ethiopian bombing of some Somali towns. Offering the Somalis the choice of some ground items which would be delivered within the year and which would be visibly useful, in addition to offering to do what we can to help Somali air defense, would allow the Somalis to establish their own priorities and to make their own choices.

The IG recommends that the SIG review the IG's conclusions to assess the adequacy of the recommended action in light of the Libyan/Ethiopian/PDRY alliance in the Horn, the need to back up our stated commitments to our regional friends, and the availability of funds, and decide whether to authorize an approach to the Somalis along the lines of the attached cable.

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Draft Cable to Embassy Mogadishu

1. Request you inform GSDR at appropriate level that, following ASD West's discussions with President Siad and MOD Omar Haji, we have carefully considered what the USC would be able to do in response to the Somali request to cancel the LOA for Vulcan and, instead, to provide as a portion of our overall efforts, assistance in transportation, communication, and engineer equipment.
2. We agree that Somalia faces severe problems in transportation, communication, and water supply. We believe that appropriate trucks, radios, and engineer equipment would enhance the abilities of the Somali military to meet these problems and to contribute to Somali national development. Such items are relatively moderate in price and, in most cases, can be delivered relatively quickly. We are willing to provide these items through our FMS program if the Somalis so desire. FYI: In instances where lead times would preclude calendar year 1982 delivery, we will explore, but not promise at this time, diversion from US inventory. END FYI.
3. We understand the Somali wish to cancel the Vulcans which are now on order. While we continue to believe that Vulcans would play a useful role in a coordinated air defense, we recognize that the lead time until their delivery is quite long, and that by themselves, Vulcans would provide only a limited capability. If, in order to procure equipment which is more readily available, the GSDR wishes to cancel the LOA for Vulcan, we will do so. They should understand, however, that in order for the contractors to recover the costs they have already incurred, some of the funds now obligated for Vulcan must remain reserved to cover these termination costs. We estimate that if the Vulcan order is cancelled, approximately \$25 million in FMS credits will be available through FY 82. FYI: We have not yet received formal notification of Somalia's intent to cancel Vulcans. Request you determine status. END FYI.
4. We assume that the Somali desire to cancel Vulcan does not indicate a decision to ignore the requirements of air defense. We agree with the priority the Somalis have accorded to air defense and are prepared to continue the programs we have begun to assist in the repair of some Soviet supplied radars and air defense guns and to purchase TPS 43 radars. We are also prepared to initiate a program to help repair Soviet supplied air defense missiles, and/or provide maintenance, logistics assistance and training for their on hand assets. However, this type assistance would require FMS funding and LOA's to cover the project.

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5. We fully recognize that not all these actions can be accomplished simultaneously, particularly within the constraints posed by the current availability of funds. The Somalis are best able to determine what the priorities among them for FY 82 should be. For this reason, we would welcome MOD, General Omar Haji Mohamed's visit. We know he wants to visit soon, and we should be prepared to discuss availability and prices of equipment and other defense services with him by the second week of December.

6. We know that the Somalis are anxious about the transfer of M-47 tanks from Italy. As we have told both the GOI and GDRS, we are now willing to approve the transfer and proceed with the necessary Congressional notification if Somalia and Italy can work out a mutually acceptable arrangement and if the GSDDR is able to provide suitable assurances to the Kenyans. However, Somalis should be aware that the US is not able to offer substantial follow-on support for these tanks. They have been out of US inventory since 1974. FYI: DOD will be sending a team to check the condition of the tanks. We have heard they are in poor condition and will want to make sure the Somalis understand what they are getting. END FYI.

7. FYI: The foregoing represents the conclusions of the Senior Interdepartmental Group. This approach recognizes that within the funds available, we will not enable the Somalis to prevent the bombing of towns such as Galcaio or Dusa Mareb. It will, however, provide some improvement in air defense and allow the early and visible delivery of dual-use items which the Somalis desire and which will be of direct benefit to Somalia. END FYI.

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Routing Slip

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Remarks:

Executive Secretary

11/24/81

Date